Westminster Policy News & Legislative Analysis

Crans-Montana bar fire: about 40 dead, 115 injured say police

At around 01:30 CET on Thursday 1 January 2026, a fire broke out at Le Constellation bar in Crans‑Montana, canton Valais. The cantonal police gave a provisional toll of about forty people dead and roughly 115 injured. The area remains sealed and an overflight ban is in place; a family helpline has been activated on 0848 112 117. Authorities say the incident is being treated as a fire; no attack is suspected, and the precise cause is still to be confirmed.

Cantonal leaders briefed the media in Lens on Thursday morning. Valais’s security chief Stéphane Ganzer said there had been a deflagration after the blaze took hold, clarifying that the explosion was not the origin of the fire. Attorney General Béatrice Pilloud stated that investigators had opened a case to establish the circumstances and that terrorism was excluded.

Hospitals across western and central Switzerland received patients through the night. Valais police listed transfers to Sion, Visp, Martigny, Rennaz, Lausanne (CHUV), Geneva (HUG), Fribourg, Bern and Zurich; Geneva University Hospitals confirmed they were fully mobilised and had received multiple patients by air and road. Officials warned that identification work would take time given the severity of burns reported.

Cross‑border health coordination began within hours. Italy’s foreign ministry said Swiss police had indicated about 40 fatalities and around 100 injured, and it set up consular support for families; Milan’s Niguarda hospital activated its mass‑casualty plan to accept severely burned patients if required. Valais’s security chief told French radio that “several dozen” patients might need treatment abroad.

Early survivor accounts described a fast‑developing fire in a crowded basement space and difficult evacuation up a narrow stair to the outside. Some witnesses told French media that a lit candle or sparkler held above a champagne bottle may have ignited the ceiling; investigators have not yet confirmed the ignition source. Such conditions can lead to “flashover”, a rapid transition to full‑room involvement when heat and smoke cause near‑simultaneous ignition.

Switzerland’s fire‑safety rules for public venues set clear benchmarks for escape provision. Guidance published on the Heureka platform, used by Swiss fire authorities, requires any room holding more than 100 people to have two independent escape routes. Required exit width increases with occupancy: at grade level, 1.2 metres per 200 persons is a typical planning factor; where stairs are involved, the same width serves only 120 persons. Maximum travel distance to an exit is generally 35 metres. Doors on escape routes must open in the direction of travel and be operable without a key.

For rooms accommodating more than 300 people, additional measures apply. Heureka’s summary of AEAI/VKF provisions sets minimum widths for stairs and escape routes, prescribes fire‑resistant construction for escape corridors, and indicates that authorities may require automatic fire detection and smoke and heat exhaust ventilation systems. These measures aim to keep escape routes tenable long enough for evacuation and firefighter access.

Interior finishes and fittings will be a central focus for investigators. Heureka notes that timber is combustible and that only limited quantities of combustible material are permitted in escape routes, with performance defined by reaction‑to‑fire classes. While wood can meet Swiss requirements when correctly detailed and protected, exposed combustible surfaces in crowded rooms can accelerate fire growth and smoke production, increasing the risk of flashover.

Any use of indoor pyrotechnic effects or so‑called “bottle sparklers” is regulated. The Federal Office of Police explains that most pyrotechnic articles-whether for entertainment or professional use-require authorisation from either fedpol or the competent canton, with categories (F for fireworks, T for theatrical) determining the permitting route. Separate federal customs guidance restricts imports and highlights that unsafe items are prohibited. Venue operators must ensure any effect is lawful, risk‑assessed and separated from combustible surfaces.

Occupancy control and crowd management are part of routine compliance. Investigators typically compare the licensed capacity against the number present, check that exits and stairs provided the required aggregate width, and confirm hardware met relevant standards for panic or emergency exit devices. Heureka further notes that at densities of about two persons per square metre, panic conditions are foreseeable and anti‑panic hardware (to SN EN 1125) is expected on routes used by the public.

Operationally, the Valais response included cordons, an airspace restriction and a central helpline, allowing search and identification work to proceed while relatives receive support. Police say the priority remains care for survivors and formal identification, after which regulatory reviews will examine licensing, building performance, and any use of pyrotechnics or decorative elements that could have contributed to the fire’s rapid development.

For venue owners and managers operating busy winter seasons, this incident underlines the value of simple checks: keep real‑time headcounts against the licence, verify that two independent escape routes are available and unobstructed, ensure exit doors open freely in the direction of travel, review any bottle‑service effects against federal and cantonal rules, and confirm that finishes near ceilings and in escape paths meet reaction‑to‑fire classifications. These are not speculative recommendations; they follow directly from Swiss fire‑safety guidance used by enforcement authorities.