Westminster Policy News & Legislative Analysis

E3 press Iran on NPT safeguards at IAEA Board, March 2026

France, Germany and the United Kingdom used the March 2026 IAEA Board of Governors meeting to restate that Iran remains in breach of its safeguards obligations and to press for immediate restoration of Agency access. The E3 said diplomacy remains the only sustainable route to resolve nuclear and regional concerns and reiterated support for the IAEA’s independent mandate, according to the statement published by the UK Government.

The three governments condemned recent Iranian attacks on countries in the region and expressed solidarity with regional partners. They added that they did not participate in strikes on Iran but were prepared to take steps to defend their interests and those of allies.

Referencing the IAEA Director General’s latest reports, the E3 underlined that the Board has been seeking progress for years and that Iran has repeatedly ignored demands to comply with its safeguards obligations, despite resolutions adopted by the Board of Governors and the UN Security Council.

The statement recalls the decision in June 2025, when the Board found Iran non‑compliant with its Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement after prolonged failure to provide the Agency with information and access needed to clarify the possible presence of undeclared nuclear material. At that point, the E3 noted, Tehran was not fully engaging with the IAEA or responding to Board concerns.

As set out by the Director General, the military interventions of June 2025 led the Agency, for staff safety, to withdraw inspectors. The E3 said they remain deeply concerned that, for more than eight months, the IAEA has been unable to access several Iranian nuclear facilities-including those presenting the highest proliferation risk-or to account for Iran’s enriched uranium stockpile.

The Director General has further reported that Iran has not provided the requested report on affected nuclear facilities and associated nuclear material. In consequence, the Agency cannot verify the status of those facilities and materials and is unable to discharge its safeguards responsibilities.

The E3 highlighted that, in light of unresolved issues, the Agency retains outstanding concerns about the possible presence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran. These matters, raised repeatedly in the IAEA’s reporting, remain open.

On enrichment, the E3 said Iran’s production of 60% high enriched uranium has no credible civilian justification and noted that Iran is the only non‑nuclear‑weapon State to have produced material at that level. They also recalled that, under reinstated UN Security Council resolutions, Iran is legally required to suspend all activities related to uranium enrichment.

The statement describes as extremely concerning the Agency’s inability to account for Iran’s uranium stockpile, including high enriched uranium equivalent to more than ten IAEA ‘significant quantities’. In the absence of access, the IAEA has relied on commercially available satellite imagery to report movement at Natanz, Fordow and Isfahan.

The Director General now reports an increasing risk of diversion, particularly around the new Isfahan Fuel Enrichment Plant. According to the E3 summary of the report, the Agency has not been granted access to the site and cannot confirm the nature or purpose of activities observed near the entrance to the Isfahan tunnel complex; it does not discount that the plant may already be operational and potentially processing material stored at Isfahan.

The E3 thanked the Director General and the Agency for continued engagement and stressed that implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement cannot be suspended under any circumstances. Cooperation with the IAEA, they argued, cannot be made conditional on issues outside a State’s legal obligations under the Treaty, as this would erode the integrity of the global safeguards system.

Policy Wire analysis: the verification gap reduces the IAEA’s capacity to provide assurance on the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran’s programme and complicates any confidence‑building around nuclear activities. The scale of material referenced-described in ‘significant quantities’-heightens the importance of inventory accounting and timely detection until inspector access is restored.

Concluding the statement, the E3 said they remain committed to diplomacy and to working with other Board members to uphold the IAEA’s authority and the integrity of the global non‑proliferation regime. They urged Iran to cooperate fully with the IAEA to resolve outstanding safeguards issues.