A 28‑point draft peace proposal circulating in Washington, Kyiv and European capitals would recast Ukraine’s security, borders and economy. The leaked text sets out a demilitarised buffer in Donetsk that would be internationally recognised as Russian, a cap of 600,000 on Ukraine’s armed forces, snap elections within 100 days, and “reliable” security guarantees whose providers are not specified. The White House is reported to want a response from Kyiv by Thursday 27 November, the U.S. Thanksgiving holiday.
On territory, the draft envisages recognising Crimea, Luhansk and Donetsk as de facto Russian, while freezing the front line in Kherson and Zaporizhzhia. Ukrainian forces would withdraw from the remaining part of Donetsk they control to create a neutral demilitarised zone that Russian troops would not enter. That zone would encompass urban hubs around Sloviansk, Kramatorsk and Druzhkivka, home to hundreds of thousands before the war.
The force‑size clause fixes Ukraine’s armed forces at 600,000 personnel. For context, open sources put active Ukrainian strength at roughly 880,000 in early 2025, up from about 250,000 pre‑invasion. Any formal ceiling would require primary legislation in Kyiv and, in practice, sustained external financing to remain viable in peacetime.
Security guarantees are billed as “reliable”, with one clause stating that if Russia re‑invades, sanctions would snap back and a “co‑ordinated military response” would follow; if Ukraine launched missiles at Moscow or St Petersburg without cause, the guarantee would be void. Reporting differs on scope, with some accounts calling the offer “NATO‑style” while others note a lack of detail on guarantors and enforcement.
Strategic alignment is central to the text. Ukraine would amend its Constitution to renounce NATO membership, while NATO would codify that Ukraine will not be admitted in future; NATO troops would not be stationed in Ukraine and European fighter jets would be based in Poland. The same draft says Ukraine “is eligible” for EU membership and would receive short‑term preferential access to EU markets. Any NATO “statute” change would require unanimous allied consent under Article 10 practice.
Those constitutional elements collide with Ukrainian law. Kyiv has enshrined its course toward EU and NATO membership in the Constitution since 2019, and the Constitution prohibits amendments during martial law. In short, the draft’s NATO clauses could not be enacted unless martial law is lifted and a supermajority in the Verkhovna Rada approves changes in accordance with Articles 157–159.
The document also calls for nationwide elections within 100 days. Ukraine’s parliament resolved in February 2025 that elections should be held only after a “comprehensive, just and sustainable peace,” reaffirming that voting cannot take place under martial law. Any snap poll would therefore depend on a legally effective cessation of hostilities and the lifting of wartime measures.
Economic provisions are far‑reaching. The draft channels $100bn from frozen Russian assets into a U.S.‑led reconstruction vehicle paying 50% of profits to the U.S., asks Europe to add $100bn, and envisions a separate U.S.–Russia investment fund for joint projects. This cuts across the EU’s own work to use asset proceeds for Ukraine while most of the €190–210bn immobilised in Europe sits at Euroclear in Belgium.
A “full amnesty” for all parties appears in later points, alongside an implementation body chaired by Donald Trump. Amnesty would run directly against ongoing accountability efforts, including International Criminal Court warrants for senior Russian officials, and would face strong resistance in Kyiv and across several EU capitals.
Weapons constraints are uneven. The text threatens to void guarantees if Ukraine strikes Russia’s major cities but otherwise sets no explicit limits on Ukraine’s defence industry or long‑range systems. It also restates Ukraine’s status as a non‑nuclear state under the NPT and tasks the IAEA with supervising the restart of the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant with output split 50:50.
Positions of key actors remain fluid. Germany’s Foreign Minister Johann Wadephul has said the 28 points should not be treated as a final plan. The European Commission signalled it has not been officially briefed and is continuing its work on the asset track. The Kremlin, for its part, says it has not received the proposal in detail, despite reports of consultations between U.S. envoy Steve Witkoff and Kirill Dmitriev.
Kyiv’s public red lines were restated at the UN this week: no recognition-formal or otherwise-of occupied territories as Russian; no limits on the right to self‑defence or the size and capabilities of its armed forces; and no infringement of its sovereign choice of alliances. With Washington pushing for an answer by 27 November, these legal and political constraints define the next steps as capitals decide whether the draft is a basis for talks or a non‑starter.