Operation Kenova’s final report states that MI5’s role in running the Army agent codenamed Stakeknife inside the Provisional IRA was far greater than previously acknowledged. The report records that MI5 was closely involved in briefing and tasking via the Army’s Force Research Unit (FRU), received debriefs on all agent intelligence, and had automatic sight of Stakeknife reporting; publicly, the Service’s role had earlier been described as peripheral.
Kenova details how MI5’s late discovery of further material in spring and summer 2024-after the Public Prosecution Service for Northern Ireland (PPSNI) had issued its decisions and after publication of the interim report-constituted a serious organisational failure. While the Director of Public Prosecutions later concluded the new material would not have changed the prosecution outcomes, Kenova finds investigative opportunities were lost.
In two instances, FRU handlers removed the agent from Northern Ireland for a holiday while he was wanted by the RUC for conspiracy to murder and false imprisonment, flying him by military aircraft and issuing military identification. The report notes MI5 was aware of this activity; had investigators possessed this material earlier, it could have been put to relevant Army personnel in interview and considered for potential assisting or harbouring offences.
Stakeknife’s handling was ring‑fenced within FRU through a facility known as the Rat Hole, overseen directly by the FRU Commanding Officer. MI5 provided an administrative support officer to maintain FRU intelligence records, and a dedicated phone line for Stakeknife was staffed around the clock.
Across the operation Kenova recovered 3,517 separate reports attributed to Stakeknife. The report records periods of intense operational contact and shows that some intelligence was graded “Not for Downward Dissemination” and not acted upon, while handlers at times knew lives were at risk.
Sir Iain Livingstone’s assessment places the number of lives saved on the basis of Stakeknife intelligence at high single figures to low double figures-explicitly not a net estimate and far from “hundreds”. The report reiterates that more lives were probably lost than saved through his continued operation as an agent.
On identification, the report supports the Neither Confirm Nor Deny (NCND) doctrine in principle but argues for proportionate use in exceptional cases, stating there is a compelling ethical case to derogate and name Stakeknife in the public interest. The report notes that NCND has allowed for exceptions.
In the House of Commons, Northern Ireland Secretary Hilary Benn said ongoing litigation relevant to NCND-the Thompson Supreme Court appeal-prevents a substantive response on naming at this time, adding that identifying agents risks jeopardising national security.
PSNI Chief Constable Jon Boutcher, who led Kenova until 2023, countered that naming would not endanger anyone, affect agent recruitment or damage intelligence work, calling the government’s position “untenable and bordering on farce”.
Prosecution decisions remain unchanged. PPSNI announced on 6 December 2023, 6 February 2024 and 29 February 2024 that there was insufficient evidence to prosecute individuals-including alleged IRA members and former soldiers-reported by Kenova. A subsequent DPP letter to Sir Iain dated 5 September 2025 confirmed that the late‑disclosed MI5 material would not have enhanced prospects of conviction.
Kenova’s reinvestigation of the 1972 killing of Jean Smyth‑Campbell concludes she was most likely shot by an unknown PIRA member with a .303 rifle near Bunbeg Park; the family disputes this and maintains that the British Army was more likely responsible.
MI5 Director General Sir Ken McCallum apologised for the late discovery of records and commissioned an independent review by former Metropolitan Police Assistant Commissioner Helen Ball, which concluded there was no evidence of deliberate withholding; MI5 says it is implementing all recommendations. Kenova’s final report also recommends reviewing NCND and classification rules, strengthening PPS resourcing and issuing formal apologies from both the UK Government and republican leadership.
For policy professionals, the immediate implications sit in three areas: NCND decision‑making in legacy cases, agent‑handling oversight and historical record management. The report’s finding that MI5 had automatic sight of Stakeknife’s reporting-and knowledge of his serious criminality-will sharpen parliamentary and judicial scrutiny of how national security exemptions are applied and how late disclosure is prevented in future.
Stakeknife is widely believed to have been west Belfast man Freddie Scappaticci, who died in 2023. The report does not name him, consistent with current government policy, but formally sets out the case for naming in the public interest.