The Rail Accident Investigation Branch has published Report 10/2025 on the derailment of a freight train at Audenshaw, Greater Manchester. The incident occurred at around 11:25 on 6 September 2024, involved nine of 24 wagons, caused significant damage, and led to an eight‑week closure. No injuries were reported. Published date: 24 December 2025.
Investigators attribute the derailment to gauge spread on a bridge deck where the track was mounted on a longitudinal bearer system rather than conventional sleepers and ballast. Wheelsets on the right side dropped when screws securing baseplates to the timber bearers had already failed, allowing the rails to move apart.
Metallurgical work identified fatigue in multiple screws before the train arrived. RAIB’s analysis concluded the screws, in the configuration used on this bridge installed in 2007, were not expected to have infinite fatigue life even though train forces were below Network Rail’s stated limits. Increased traffic since 2015 accelerated the fatigue process.
RAIB found that neither automated nor manual inspections reliably identified screw failures. Routine dynamic track geometry readings remained within standard tolerances, so no intervention was triggered. Previous screw failures at the site had occurred and were not consistently recorded.
The report cites two underlying governance issues: Network Rail lacked effective processes for the design assurance, installation, inspection and maintenance of longitudinal bearer assets; and the responsible maintenance team did not record or escalate earlier screw failures, with assurance processes failing to correct this over several years.
Eight recommendations are issued to Network Rail. They cover component assurance in LBS designs; improved management guidance for design, installation, maintenance and failure reporting; competence of staff managing these assets; stronger interfaces between track and structures disciplines; better understanding of how supporting structures affect track behaviour; assessment of traffic changes on LBS performance; complete and accurate asset configuration records; and strengthened assurance of inspection and maintenance records.
For policy and governance teams, the package signals a shift from geometry‑only triggers to configuration‑ and component‑level assurance for LBS sites. Network Rail is expected to consider RAIB recommendations and act appropriately, with the Office of Rail and Road confirming that recipients are required to take recommendations into consideration and implement suitable actions.
Inspection practice is a central lesson. Compliance with geometry limits did not reveal the underlying failure mode at Audenshaw; targeted checks of fastening integrity on longitudinal bearers, improved data capture, and cross‑discipline reviews with structures teams are likely to be required to manage comparable risks.
The eight‑week closure illustrates the operational exposure from undetected fastening failures on bridge decks. Asset owners should expect greater emphasis on configuration certainty, record completeness and traffic‑growth assumptions when planning renewals or interim mitigations on similar LBS installations.
RAIB reiterates that its purpose is safety learning rather than apportioning blame, with findings aimed at preventing recurrence. Network Rail’s response will be considered alongside the regulator’s role in ensuring recommendations are taken into account and acted upon.