Interviews gathered by BBC News from Tehran describe a city living between long silences and sudden blasts. Residents say movement has narrowed to essential trips as the conflict that began on 28 February intensified after the killing of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and the Assembly of Experts named Mojtaba Khamenei as his successor on 8 March, according to Iranian state media reports carried by the Associated Press. Local outlets have also reported repeated drone activity over the capital amid tighter controls on movement. (apnews.com)
One interviewee, a businesswoman in her thirties referred to as “Baran,” told BBC News she now largely remains indoors, coordinating with friends via messages to confirm each other’s safety. She said even quiet periods feel precarious, describing nights lit by the glow of explosions and days shaped by planning for the next alert. Her account reflects the lived reality of civilians adapting to intermittent aerial threats and the unpredictability of strike timings.
A second resident, “Ali,” said masked and armed personnel have established checkpoints near his home and across key routes. He characterised neighbourhood streets as drained of everyday life and described relying on medication to cope with escalating anxiety. He also spoke of clashing emotions: a desire for domestic political change set against the perception that the country is under external attack-an ambivalence others echoed in BBC News’ testimony.
These accounts align with wider reporting of a dense security posture in the capital. Amnesty International has documented heavily militarised patrols and checkpoint networks during the January crackdown, while Iran International has reported more recent strikes on or near checkpoints and the use of mosques as operational hubs for patrols. The Basij, an auxiliary force under the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, routinely augments police units in such operations alongside formations overseen by the Imam Ali Central Security Headquarters. (amnesty.org)
Information space constraints are pronounced. Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting holds a legal monopoly over domestic radio and television under Article 175 of Iran’s constitution; its head is appointed by the Supreme Leader. The Press Law of 1986 and the 2009 Computer Crimes Law provide broad grounds to restrict content and impose liability on platforms and users, and the Committee to Protect Journalists notes at least 15 journalists remain jailed. The wartime period has also seen extended near‑total internet shutdowns recorded by NetBlocks, sharply limiting independent reporting and contact with the diaspora. (constituteproject.org)
The legal and institutional framework concentrates crisis decision‑making in bodies led or overseen by the executive and the Supreme Leader. Article 110 assigns the Leader overall command authority, while Article 176 establishes the Supreme National Security Council, chaired by the president, to coordinate national defence and security policy. Since mid‑2025, the SNSC has also operated a Defence Council to manage wartime planning and inter‑agency coordination, according to official and state‑linked reports. (constituteproject.org)
The January domestic crackdown is central to how residents interpret the present moment. Iran’s then‑Supreme Leader said the protests left “several thousand” people dead; rights organisations separately reported widespread use of live fire, mass arrests and a militarised security footprint, though precise figures remain contested due to severe reporting restrictions. Civilians interviewed by the BBC linked their current fear to losses suffered during those events. (apnews.com)
Since the war’s start on 28 February, repeated disruptions have also targeted Iran’s connectivity. NetBlocks and other monitors recorded national traffic at between four percent and one percent of ordinary levels over multiple days, with the Associated Press reporting further deepening of the blackout as operations escalated. The effect has been to compress the information space into state media and controlled channels, while making it harder to verify casualties or damage in real time. (forbes.com)
Residents told the BBC that official broadcasts now largely present mass funerals, denunciations of the United States and Israel, and declarations of public endurance. That aligns with IRIB’s statutory role and editorial line under Supreme Leader appointment powers. Independent journalists who attempt to document alternative narratives face detention on national‑security grounds under existing laws, according to CPJ and past court practice cited by human rights groups. (en.wikipedia.org)
For practitioners and consular teams, risks to civilians and foreign nationals remain acute. The UK’s Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office advises against all travel to Iran and warns that consular access is severely constrained; the United States maintains a Level 4 ‘Do Not Travel’ advisory citing wrongful detention and conflict risks. Movement within Tehran can be further limited by ad hoc checkpoints and communications outages. (gov.uk)
Looking ahead, interviewees anticipate a protracted confrontation with enduring psychological effects. In the near term, the combination of air threat, intensive internal security activity, and restricted media space points to sustained pressure on civil life. Policy decisions taken through the Supreme National Security Council structure, coupled with IRIB’s monopoly and emergency communications controls, will continue to shape what residents see, hear and can safely say. (en.wikipedia.org)