President Donald Trump said on 29 November that the airspace above and around Venezuela should be considered “closed in its entirety”. The remark, posted on Truth Social, has no legal force over Venezuela’s sovereign airspace and was not accompanied by a U.S. regulatory order applying to civil operators. Reuters and the Washington Post reported no immediate operational guidance from the White House or Pentagon beyond the post itself. Under the Chicago Convention, only the territorial state may restrict or close its airspace.
What has changed for civil aviation is the Federal Aviation Administration’s security advisory for the Maiquetía flight information region (SVZM). On 21 November, the FAA published KICZ NOTAM A0012/25 and a background briefing warning U.S. civil aviation to exercise caution due to a worsening security situation and heightened military activity in and around Venezuela, with threats at all altitudes and reports of GNSS interference since September. The advisory is time‑limited and stops short of a prohibition on operations.
Venezuela has responded to widespread flight suspensions by revoking operating permits for six international carriers that did not comply with a 48‑hour ultimatum to resume services. The civil aviation authority cited Iberia, TAP Portugal, Avianca, LATAM Colombia, Gol and Turkish Airlines. The move followed the FAA caution and adds uncertainty for passengers using Caracas as a hub or for long‑haul itineraries transiting Venezuelan airspace.
Parallel to the aviation advisories, the U.S. has increased its regional military presence. The U.S. Navy confirms the USS Gerald R. Ford Carrier Strike Group entered the Caribbean Sea on 16 November to join forces already assigned to U.S. Southern Command. Washington Post reporting put total U.S. personnel in the wider area at roughly 15,000, describing the posture as the largest in decades.
Since early September, U.S. forces have acknowledged at least 21 lethal strikes on vessels they say were linked to drug trafficking in the Caribbean and eastern Pacific, with a publicly reported death toll of about 83. The administration has not released evidence demonstrating the presence of narcotics aboard the targeted boats. Congressional oversight has intensified, including statements from the Senate Armed Services Committee.
The legal context shifted on 24 November when the U.S. State Department designated Cartel de los Soles as a Foreign Terrorist Organization under section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act, following a July action by the Treasury to list the group as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist. FTO status engages 18 U.S.C. §2339B, making it a federal offence to provide material support to the organisation; it also facilitates asset blocking and immigration consequences.
Caracas has rejected the U.S. designation, with the foreign ministry condemning it as a “ridiculous” and “non‑existent” label intended to justify an intervention. Domestic officials, including the vice‑president, repeated that position in local media. These statements underline that Venezuela disputes both the existence of a coherent “cartel” and Washington’s legal framing.
For operators, the practical distinction is important. A presidential statement cannot close another country’s airspace; only Venezuela can impose restrictions within the SVZM FIR, and any third‑country overflight restrictions for U.S. operators must come via FAA rulemaking, typically through Security NOTAMs or Special Federal Aviation Regulations. As of today, the FAA notice is advisory; insurers and dispatchers are nonetheless likely to route around Venezuelan airspace until risk assessments ease.
European regulators have not issued a conflict‑zone bulletin specific to Venezuela. EASA continues to maintain a list of active Conflict Zone Information Bulletins, but none currently relate to Venezuelan airspace; operators remain responsible for their own risk assessments using state notices and company procedures.
Policy watchpoints now include whether the FAA escalates from caution to prohibition, whether Caracas widens its permit revocations, and whether the U.S. military posture changes the risk profile for civil aviation-particularly GNSS interference and air defence activity. For travel planners, the near‑term impact is longer routings, schedule changes, and potential fare increases on Latin America networks until regulatory signals are clearer.