President Donald Trump has set out a muscular regional doctrine following the U.S. operation that seized Nicolás Maduro in Caracas. In remarks over the weekend he recast the 1823 Monroe Doctrine as the “Donroe Doctrine”, presenting the raid as proof of restored U.S. primacy in the hemisphere. Maduro and his wife, Cilia Flores, were flown to New York to face narcotics‑related charges; both pleaded not guilty on 5 January. The White House has framed the action as a law‑enforcement mission with strategic backing.
Trump’s language since the raid has extended beyond Venezuela. He has said the United States will “run” the country pending a transition and signalled a possible second strike if remaining officials do not cooperate. He coupled that with an explicit revival of a U.S. sphere‑of‑influence doctrine in the Americas. Critics across Europe and Latin America argue the legal basis is unclear and risks normalising unilateral action.
Greenland is now in focus. The U.S. already operates Pituffik Space Base (formerly Thule) in north‑west Greenland; Trump told reporters the U.S. “needs” the island for national security, citing Russian and Chinese activity. Greenland’s prime minister, Jens‑Frederik Nielsen, rejected any talk of U.S. control as “fantasy,” insisting any dialogue must be via proper channels and in line with international law.
Copenhagen and European partners have responded that Greenland, as part of the Kingdom of Denmark, is covered by NATO’s collective defence commitments. Danish and other European officials warned that any coercive move against Greenland would rupture alliance norms. The Danish government also points out that the United States already has extensive defence access under existing arrangements.
Resource security underpins the Greenland dispute. The Arctic territory hosts significant rare‑earth deposits while the United States remains heavily reliant on China for rare‑earth processing. Recent data show China accounts for roughly 70% of global mine output and close to 90% of refining, with around 70–77% of U.S. rare‑earth imports sourced from China despite efforts to diversify.
On Colombia, Trump escalated rhetoric against President Gustavo Petro, saying he should “watch his ass,” and did not rule out an operation, saying it “sounds good to me” when asked. Tensions have mounted since Washington began striking suspected drug‑smuggling boats in the Caribbean and eastern Pacific in September; at least 115 people have been killed in those attacks, according to official tallies. In October, the U.S. Treasury also sanctioned Petro under counternarcotics authorities.
The Iran file remains volatile. Amid renewed nationwide protests, Trump warned Tehran it would be “hit very hard” if security forces kill more demonstrators. That threat follows the June 2025 Israel–Iran war, when U.S. forces struck Iran’s nuclear sites during a 12‑day conflict. A Mar‑a‑Lago meeting with Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu last week again put Iran at the top of the agenda, with reporting that further strikes in 2026 were discussed.
Mexico features repeatedly in the president’s remarks. Trump says drugs are “pouring” through the border and that the U.S. may “have to do something.” Mexico’s president, Claudia Sheinbaum, has rejected any U.S. military action on Mexican soil, while continuing cooperation on security. On day one of his term, Trump ordered federal use of the term “Gulf of America” for the U.S. continental‑shelf portions of the Gulf of Mexico; agencies have since moved to implement that change in regulations.
Cuba has long been under U.S. sanctions and relied in part on Venezuelan oil. After the raid, Trump suggested the island was “ready to fall” without intervention. Reuters reporting indicates Venezuela supplies roughly 30% of Cuba’s oil in some periods, underscoring Havana’s exposure to supply shocks. Cuba says 32 of its nationals were killed during the U.S. operation in Venezuela.
Legal and diplomatic questions now dominate. Maduro’s team is expected to argue sovereign‑immunity and unlawful capture, but analysts note U.S. courts previously rejected head‑of‑state immunity for Manuel Noriega, stressing that recognition by the U.S. executive is decisive. International‑law experts also question Washington’s legal basis for using force absent self‑defence or UN authorisation, even if a domestic indictment exists.
For policy professionals, the immediate watch points are clear: any U.S. move to define a transitional authority in Caracas; signals to Bogotá after October’s OFAC designations; whether NATO states formalise assurances regarding Greenland; the scale of Iranian protest repression and any allied response; and whether U.S.–Mexico security cooperation holds amid sharper rhetoric.