US President Donald Trump warned that Cuba should “make a deal” or face consequences, stating that flows of Venezuelan oil and money to the island would cease. The message followed a 3 January operation in Caracas in which Venezuelan leader Nicolás Maduro was seized, and came alongside stepped-up maritime enforcement against sanctioned cargoes.
Venezuela is understood to provide roughly 35,000 barrels per day to Cuba, a long-standing economic lifeline. The US practice of confiscating tankers carrying sanctioned Venezuelan oil has already tightened supplies, compounding fuel and electricity shortfalls on the island.
On Friday, 9 January, authorities reported the fifth such seizure in recent days. Maritime interdictions of this kind typically trigger knock-on effects across shipping, insurance and chartering markets, raising compliance costs for operators active in the Caribbean and Gulf of Mexico corridors.
Cuban foreign minister Bruno Rodríguez responded that Havana retains an “absolute right” to import fuel from willing exporters without interference and rejected what he called unilateral coercive measures by the United States. President Miguel Díaz-Canel added that no external actor dictates Cuba’s decisions.
Trump, posting on Truth Social on Sunday 11 January, said there would be “no more oil or money” going to Cuba and urged Havana to agree terms “before it is too late”. The administration has not set out what a “deal” would entail or the specific penalties threatened.
He also asserted that Cuba had provided security services to successive Venezuelan leaders, a characterisation Havana disputes. Rodríguez said Cuba had never received monetary or material compensation for such support and stated that the country does not lend itself to blackmail or military coercion.
The Caracas operation led to the detention of Maduro and his wife, Cilia Flores, who now face US charges including drug trafficking. Cuban authorities said 32 of their nationals were killed during the raid; Trump subsequently wrote that most of those personnel were dead and that Venezuela no longer needed protection from what he called “thugs and extortionists”.
While Washington has not published a detailed Cuba strategy, Trump has previously argued that military intervention was unnecessary because the country was “ready to fall”. Secretary of State Marco Rubio said last week he would be concerned if he were in the Cuban government, adding that its leaders were “in a lot of trouble”.
Trump amplified a social media post suggesting Rubio could become president of Cuba, commenting that it “sounds good” to him. The exchange underscores the administration’s rhetorical pressure on Havana alongside enforcement actions at sea.
More broadly, Trump has framed regional policy through a revived Monroe Doctrine-rebranded by allies as the “Donroe Doctrine”-and has focused on left‑wing leaders he accuses of enabling narcotics trafficking. After the Caracas raid he said a military operation targeting Colombia “sounds good” and has repeatedly told President Gustavo Petro to “watch his ass”. The United States sanctioned Petro in October, alleging he allowed drug cartels to flourish; Bogotá rejects the accusation.
The President has also said drugs are “pouring” through Mexico and has offered to deploy US forces to combat cartels, a proposal publicly rejected by Mexican President Claudia Sheinbaum. Any cross‑border operation would carry significant legal and diplomatic risks and would face explicit opposition from Mexico City.
US–Cuba relations remain strained. Steps toward normalisation under former president Barack Obama were reversed under Trump, and, shortly after taking office for a second term, the administration reinstated Cuba’s designation as a state sponsor of terrorism. For Cuba, tightened energy sanctions and interdictions raise the likelihood of longer power outages and rationing; for international operators, they increase exposure to secondary sanctions and enforcement actions.