Two men have been charged under the National Security Act following a Counter Terrorism Policing London investigation into suspected reconnaissance of individuals and locations linked to London’s Jewish community. BBC News reports the defendants as Nematollah Shahsavani, 40, a dual British–Iranian national from North Finchley, and Alireza Farasati, 22, an Iranian national from Edgware. Both are accused of engaging in conduct likely to assist the Iranian intelligence service between 9 July 2025 and 15 August 2025, and are due to appear at Westminster Magistrates’ Court on Thursday, 19 March 2026. The Metropolitan Police previously said the wider investigation concerns suspected surveillance activity connected to Iran. (news.met.police.uk)
The Crown Prosecution Service has authorised charges for conduct “likely to assist a foreign intelligence service,” an offence created by the National Security Act 2023. In this case, prosecutors indicated that activities included reconnaissance of potential targets, reflecting how the statute is being applied to preparatory behaviours rather than solely to the handling of protected information. The CPS has used the same offence wording in earlier Iran‑linked prosecutions. (cps.gov.uk)
Counter Terrorism Policing’s Deputy Assistant Commissioner has described such cases as extremely serious, emphasising the intention to act quickly where potential threats to public safety are identified. The force has separately reassured Jewish organisations that protective security continues to be coordinated with specialist advisers and local officers as investigations progress. Recent public communications from Counter Terrorism Policing have underlined this approach. (counterterrorism.police.uk)
Section 3 of the National Security Act criminalises conduct intended to, or likely to, materially assist a foreign intelligence service in carrying out UK‑related activities. The offence carries a maximum penalty of 14 years’ imprisonment on conviction on indictment. Government explanatory notes set out examples spanning provision of information, services, goods or financial benefits to, or for the benefit of, a foreign intelligence service. (legislation.gov.uk)
The case sits within a broader operational picture. On 6 March 2026, Counter Terrorism Policing London arrested four men-one Iranian national and three dual British–Iranian nationals-on suspicion of assisting a foreign intelligence service in relation to suspected surveillance of Jewish community sites. Police secured extended detention while enquiries continued. Today’s charges are distinct, but they illustrate how the post‑2023 legal framework is now being used in live state‑threat investigations. (news.met.police.uk)
Policy context matters for compliance teams. The UK has placed specified Iranian state bodies on the enhanced tier of the Foreign Influence Registration Scheme established under the National Security Act. That designation increases transparency obligations for certain arrangements with those bodies, complementing the use of Section 3 in criminal cases. Organisations engaging internationally should review whether any activity falls within FIRS registration scope. (legislation.gov.uk)
For Jewish institutions and community providers, the operational implication is continued close working with police and the Community Security Trust on protective security, reporting routes and incident response. The Metropolitan Police has stated that public vigilance and rapid reporting remain essential alongside proactive policing in state‑threat cases. (cst.org.uk)
As with all criminal proceedings, the defendants are presumed innocent unless and until proven guilty. Given the seriousness of Section 3 allegations, first appearances are typically followed by transfer to the Crown Court. Defence and prosecution will address issues such as the foreign power link, the materiality of any alleged assistance, and any admissibility matters arising from sensitive intelligence handling under the new Act. (cps.gov.uk)