The UK and Belgium have issued a joint statement to deepen bilateral cooperation across security, migration, trade, research and energy. Published by the UK government on 12 December 2025, the text sits explicitly within the EU‑UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement (TCA) and the Renewed Agenda for EU–UK Cooperation agreed on 19 May 2025. It also recognises Belgium’s federal and community competences and commits both sides to an ongoing, structured dialogue.
On defence, both governments reaffirm support for Ukraine and set out practical cooperation against hybrid threats, including cyber and electronic warfare. The statement links North Sea infrastructure protection to work already underway through NorthSeal and the UK‑led Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF), whose recent activities to deter threats to undersea cables and pipelines demonstrate the operational focus envisaged here.
Policy Wire analysis: tying maritime security to energy reliability is deliberate. NorthSeal’s information‑sharing platform and JEF’s rapid response options-most recently used in early 2025 around the Baltic-provide mechanisms the two governments can now reference in bilateral planning without creating new structures. Expect more coordinated patrols and data‑fusion around critical seabed assets.
On serious and organised crime, the partners signal a new Law Enforcement Cooperation Agreement (LECA) to be signed in 2026, building on operational channels with Europol, Interpol and the Prüm framework. The EU’s ‘Prüm II’ law widens automated data categories to include facial images and police records, so an eventual UK‑Belgium LECA will need to dovetail with that regime and the TCA’s existing law enforcement chapter.
The statement emphasises port and logistics security-especially at major gateways-and commits the countries, now both members of the IMO Council for the 2026–27 term, to align on maritime safety, security and decarbonisation. Belgium’s return to the Council alongside the UK gives the pair a platform to steer technical debates relevant to interconnectors, green corridors and port risk management.
On irregular migration, London and Brussels will expand joint upstream disruption of smuggling networks, share information on returns and readmissions, and deploy technology at key nodes such as Zeebrugge. This builds on the Calais Group’s 2025 priority plan across the UK, Belgium, France, Germany and the Netherlands, where joint operations with Europol and Eurojust have targeted small‑boat supply chains and associated illicit finance.
Both sides reaffirm commitment to the European Convention on Human Rights. That matters for continuity of security cooperation under the TCA, which includes a safeguard allowing suspension if ECHR adherence lapses. The statement therefore couples operational tightening on smuggling with an explicit legal baseline, aiming to keep cross‑border policing tools stable.
On growth and trade, the governments pledge to reduce frictions under the TCA and Renewed Agenda, support temporary mobility for business and research, and step up dialogue on economic security, including FDI screening, supply‑chain diversification and critical infrastructure protection. For traders, this signals more practical facilitation-particularly customs cooperation and targeted guidance for SMEs-within existing treaty instruments rather than a wholesale rewrite.
Research and innovation feature prominently. The statement references pharmaceuticals, life sciences, AI, semiconductors and engineering biology, and points to programme‑level collaboration through Horizon Europe, to which the UK has been associated since 1 January 2024. Universities and research institutes in both countries can therefore plan joint bids on the same footing as other associated states.
On health security, the partners say they will build on the UK’s membership of the EU Critical Medicines Alliance and cooperate on supply resilience and shortage prevention. The European Commission describes the Alliance as a stakeholder forum focused on strengthening EU production and diversification; the bilateral reference indicates intent to plug UK authorities and firms into those workstreams where possible.
Energy cooperation is set to be updated from the February 2022 memorandum. Priority items include ensuring smooth operation of existing interconnectors and advancing Nautilus, the proposed hybrid link with capacity to move power between grids and bring offshore wind to shore via Princess Elisabeth Island. Ofgem’s green‑light for development in 2024 and the project’s PCI/PMI status underpin the governments’ intent to keep momentum.
Policy Wire analysis: Nautilus would extend the model proven by Nemo Link-now a highly available 1 GW connector-by combining interconnection with offshore wind integration. For system operators and industrial users, this supports price convergence and flexibility as both countries expand variable generation in the North Sea.
On carbon capture, the partners aim to conclude by the first half of 2026 a bilateral arrangement under the London Protocol to enable cross‑border CO2 transport for permanent geological storage. The 2009 amendment allowing such exports is not yet in force, but a 2019 resolution permits provisional application where parties file declarations and bilateral arrangements. A UK–Belgium instrument would operationalise that route.
Maritime decarbonisation also features. Both countries are signatories of the Clydebank Declaration and plan to establish green shipping corridors between their ports. In practice, this points to corridor‑specific partnerships among ports, carriers and fuel suppliers, aligned with IMO work on fuels and lifecycle accounting.
Finally, the statement confirms Belgium’s federated model is engaged: the federal government, Flanders, Wallonia, the Brussels‑Capital Region and the French and German Communities are all signatories on the Belgian side. For UK departments and agencies, that provides a clear map of interlocutors as sectoral workstreams move from headline commitments to delivery in 2026.