Westminster Policy News & Legislative Analysis

UK announces espionage action plan after MI5 China alert

MI5 has issued an espionage alert to MPs, peers and Parliamentary staff on 18 November 2025, warning that China-linked operatives are seeking to recruit individuals with access to sensitive government information. Security Minister Dan Jarvis announced a Counter Political Interference and Espionage Action Plan in response, signalling further measures to disrupt hostile state activity.

According to the government, MI5 identified two online profiles believed to be genuine headhunters acting for Chinese intelligence and cultivating targets via professional networking platforms. The service described public alerts as a principal method to degrade hostile operations and warn potential targets in real time.

The new action plan will see intelligence agencies deliver security briefings to political parties and issue updated guidance for election candidates on recognising and reporting suspicious approaches. Ministers also plan to work with professional networking sites to make recruitment operations more difficult, and to tighten political finance rules through a forthcoming Elections Bill. Jarvis said the UK will continue action against China-based actors involved in malicious cyber activity.

Jarvis confirmed fresh investment to strengthen official capabilities: £170 million to renew sovereign encrypted technology used by civil servants, and £130 million to build Counter Terrorism Policing’s capacity to enforce the National Security Act and to expand the National Cyber Security Centre and National Protective Security Authority support for critical businesses and intellectual property protection.

The minister told Parliament the government has completed the removal of surveillance equipment made by companies subject to the People’s Republic of China’s National Intelligence Law from sensitive government sites worldwide. This follows earlier instructions issued in November 2022 to cease deploying Chinese visual surveillance systems on sensitive parts of the government estate.

The statutory framework underpinning today’s measures is the National Security Act 2023. Relevant offences include obtaining or disclosing protected information (section 1), assisting a foreign intelligence service (section 3) and obtaining a material benefit from a foreign intelligence service (section 17). The government’s plan aims to improve operational enforcement of these provisions across policing and the intelligence community.

Related legislative work is under way. The Department for Science, Innovation and Technology introduced the Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill on 12 November 2025. The Bill would expand the NIS regulatory regime to more entities, strengthen regulator powers, enhance incident reporting and create new levers over critical suppliers, managed service providers and data centres.

Transparency measures on foreign political activity are already in force. The Foreign Influence Registration Scheme began on 1 July 2025, with the grace period ending on 1 October. Under the enhanced tier, Russia and Iran are specified; failure to register can carry criminal penalties, complementing any new donation rules the Elections Bill may advance.

Policy Wire analysis: for parties, candidates and campaign staff, the operational priority is prevention. Party headquarters should schedule MI5 briefings, adopt the forthcoming guidance, and embed donor due diligence procedures alongside training for staff on handling unsolicited approaches via professional networking sites, reflecting official advice on countering espionage and political interference.

Policy Wire analysis: for departments and critical businesses, the funding and forthcoming cyber legislation point to tighter requirements on secure communications, supplier oversight and incident reporting. Security leads should map assets and third parties against the Cyber Security and Resilience Bill’s scope and align programmes with NCSC and NPSA engagement, while procurement teams verify the removal of high‑risk surveillance equipment from sensitive environments.