In a statement published by the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office on GOV.UK, the UK argued that cooperation between the United Nations and the African Union is now a practical requirement for addressing several of Africa's most difficult peace and security challenges. The intervention treats that partnership not as a diplomatic add-on, but as a working arrangement needed to manage conflict, support mediation and limit further humanitarian harm. The government's case begins with the Secretary-General's report. It says conflicts across parts of the continent are becoming more complex, with terrorism, unconstitutional changes of government, external interference and climate pressures all adding strain. In the UK's account, those pressures do not only weaken security; they also risk slowing political and economic progress.
The first policy message is institutional. London says closer contact between the UN Security Council and the AU Peace and Security Council should be sustained, with regular engagement, stronger links between headquarters and better coordination in the field. It also signalled support for the AU Peace and Security Council's visit to New York later in the month. For officials working on prevention or mission design, the practical point is straightforward. Earlier joint assessment can improve risk identification, strengthen mediation and help resolve disputes before they escalate into costlier crises. The speech presents coordination as a way to reduce both the human toll and the financial burden that follow delayed action.
The UK also uses the statement to show that its support is financial as well as political. It repeats its backing for permanent African representation on the Security Council and points to a £25 million African Union Partnership Programme. That programme supports AU mediation work and the UNDP-AUC African Facility to Support Inclusive Transitions, which assists states facing difficult political transitions. This is a notable part of the argument. The statement places mediation, transition support and peace and security work in the same policy frame, rather than treating them as separate files. For readers outside the UN system, the message is that durable stability depends on institutions being able to manage contested political change as well as immediate security threats.
Somalia is presented as the clearest test case. The UK says African Union forces, backed by the UN and operating alongside Somali and other forces, have made significant sacrifices in support of stability. Over the past year, London says it has provided £16.5 million of direct support to AUSSOM and a further £8.5 million to the UN trust fund that enables logistical support for Somali security forces. The emphasis now shifts from support to transition management. The speech says urgent and realistic coordination between Somalia, the African Union, troop-contributing countries and the UN will be needed if recent gains are to be protected. In policy terms, that points to a familiar risk: political agreement, funding and operational planning all have to move together if a security transition is to hold.
The same logic is applied to other major crises. In Sudan, the UK says cooperation through the Quintet is supporting an inclusive, Sudanese-led political process, while closer alignment between UN and AU fact-finding missions is helping to strengthen accountability and avoid duplication. In northern Ethiopia, the statement says close UN-AU cooperation is essential in responding to the current escalation. In eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, the government describes AU mediation and UN peacekeeping efforts as complementary to the Washington and Doha processes. That matters because it recognises that conflict diplomacy in the region now runs through several channels at once. The UK's position is that better coordination between them is more useful than competition over ownership.
The speech also broadens the case beyond active conflict management. It points to joint work on climate security, women's participation, security sector reform, disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration, and counter-terrorism as areas where the UN-AU relationship can add practical value. The common thread is that political, security and governance work are being treated as connected tasks. For UK foreign policy, this is a signal that the African Union is being approached not only as a regional security body, but as a political institution with a role in prevention, legitimacy and long-term stabilisation. That is consistent with the government's preference for working through multilateral arrangements where regional ownership can improve access and follow-through.
The closing section turns to Security Council resolution 2719, which the UK says it was pleased to support. The resolution created the framework for UN support to AU-led peace support operations, and the speech describes it as an important step in making that support more usable in practice. London says the UN and AU have already made progress in putting the framework into operation. The more important point, however, is the condition attached to that support. The UK says momentum now needs to be maintained so that tools and mechanisms are ready when required, but with robust oversight and clear human rights and financial compliance standards. The final position is clear: London wants a stronger African Union working with a stronger United Nations, but within a system that is properly funded, properly supervised and politically coordinated.