The UK used the OSCE Permanent Council in Vienna on 15 January 2026 to condemn Russia’s 8 January missile and drone barrage against Ukraine. Ambassador Neil Holland said an intermediate‑range ballistic missile, known as Oreshnik, struck in Lviv region roughly 50 miles from NATO territory, placing the incident close to an allied border according to the UK’s account.
According to the Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office transcript, the overnight attack killed and injured civilians, damaged a Qatari diplomatic premises, and targeted energy facilities, leaving hundreds of thousands without power and heating in severe winter conditions. The UK described the repeated targeting of energy infrastructure as the “weaponisation of winter” and called it “barbaric”.
The statement recorded that Russia first used the Oreshnik system against Dnipro in November 2024 and characterised its latest employment as escalatory. By emphasising proximity to NATO territory, the UK situated the strike within a wider European security frame that touches allied air defence planning and incident response.
London also rejected Russia’s claim that the barrage responded to an attack on a presidential residence, stating there was no such incident. The UK framed this as a false narrative intended to deflect blame and avoid engaging with peace initiatives under discussion among partners.
The UK said the United States, Ukraine and other partners continue to work towards a just and durable peace, arguing these efforts are at their most promising stage. The government’s message was that Moscow started the war and is actively obstructing credible diplomacy, including by attempting to shape information conditions around attacks.
Policy commitments were restated. The UK pledged to continue military and financial support for Ukraine while increasing pressure on Russia to enter meaningful negotiations. The government described British backing for a just settlement as “iron‑clad”, signalling no change in support heading into late winter.
Analysis: the reported damage to a Qatari diplomatic premises highlights consular risk across neighbouring states. While the UK statement did not cite treaty provisions, incidents involving diplomatic property typically prompt security reviews by host authorities and missions, including checks on blast protection and contingency staffing.
Analysis: sustained strikes on the energy system during sub‑zero temperatures increase humanitarian need and complicate grid stabilisation. For European partners, outages in western Ukraine can disrupt aid logistics, strain cross‑border reception capacity during displacement spikes, and require flexible power support arrangements.
Analysis: the UK’s focus on an intermediate‑range missile in Lviv region underscores concern about proximity to allied territory. Events near Poland’s border increase the premium on rapid incident verification and de‑confliction channels to reduce the risk of miscalculation and unintended escalation.
The remarks were delivered by the UK’s Ambassador to the OSCE in Vienna and published by the FCDO on 15 January 2026. The statement’s through‑line is consistent with recent UK positions at the OSCE: attribution of responsibility for civilian harm to Russia, rejection of disinformation used to justify strikes, and continued support for Ukraine through winter.