A statutory public inquiry concluded on 4 December 2025 that the 2018 Novichok operation in Salisbury was authorised by President Vladimir Putin and carried out by Russia’s military intelligence service, the GRU. Chair Lord (Anthony) Hughes said those who ordered and executed the mission bear moral responsibility for the death of Dawn Sturgess. The UK immediately set out sanctions against the GRU in response.
On the question of protecting Sergei Skripal after his 2010 spy swap, the inquiry found failings in management, notably the absence of regular written risk assessments. However, it concluded that the state’s judgement at the time-that Skripal was not at significant risk of assassination-was not unreasonable on the information then available. The chair added that the only measure likely to have prevented the attack would have been to hide Skripal completely under a new identity, a step he did not seek.
Investigators assessed “overwhelming” evidence that a GRU team-operating under the aliases Alexander Petrov, Ruslan Boshirov and Sergey Fedotov-applied Novichok to Skripal’s front door on 4 March 2018. Months later, a counterfeit perfume bottle used to transport the agent was discarded and found in Amesbury; Sturgess was fatally exposed after spraying it on her wrists. UK authorities have charged three suspects, though extradition is unlikely.
Open‑source investigations later identified Petrov and Boshirov as Dr Alexander Mishkin and Col Anatoliy Chepiga, with Fedotov as Maj Gen Denis Sergeev, officers linked to GRU Unit 29155. These findings added detail on the unit’s methods and previous overseas activity, informing European security services’ understanding of Russian extraterritorial operations.
The Salisbury attack prompted the largest collective expulsion of suspected Russian intelligence officers in decades, alongside tighter European cooperation. EU institutions and multiple capitals expelled staff in 2018; after Russia’s full‑scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, further waves of expulsions followed, and countries such as France tightened visa scrutiny to restrict suspected cover roles.
Russia has adapted. UK courts this year convicted a UK‑based Bulgarian group for surveillance and discussions about kidnap and “honeytrap” plots targeting Kremlin critics, work prosecutors said was contracted for Moscow. Targets included journalists Christo Grozev and Roman Dobrokhotov, underscoring the blend of criminal and intelligence tradecraft now seen in Europe.
A parallel case showed the use of domestic criminals for sabotage. Six Britons were jailed for a £1m arson attack on an east London warehouse supplying Starlink equipment and aid to Ukraine, with the court hearing the plot was organised for Russia’s Wagner network. Two ringleaders were among the first people convicted under the National Security Act 2023.
Counter Terrorism Policing now treats hostile‑state activity as a core part of its workload. The Home Secretary told Parliament in May that policing investigations into state threats have risen five‑fold since 2018; she also confirmed a new cross‑government State Threats Joint Unit and signalled plans for a dedicated proscription power for state‑linked organisations, modelled on counter‑terrorism tools.
On public protection, the inquiry judged the government’s early public health advice after the Salisbury attack to have been reasonable given what was known, but said emergency‑service training on nerve‑agent recognition should have been more widely disseminated. Wiltshire Police apologised for wrongly labelling Sturgess a drug user; the force says it has set out 21 areas for improvement.
For those at risk from hostile‑state activity, the Home Office has issued guidance on transnational repression-covering reporting routes and practical steps-and ministers have endorsed a review focused on improving coordination and support for targeted individuals. The government’s formal response notes new training available to all territorial police forces.
The enforcement picture remains difficult. The UK has charged three GRU suspects over Salisbury and secured Interpol notices, but there is no realistic path to extradition while they remain in Russia. Sanctions and public attribution therefore continue to be the primary levers alongside policing and security measures at home.
Taken together, the inquiry’s conclusions and recent cases point to a shift in threat profile rather than a reduction in risk: fewer opportunities for covert officers under diplomatic cover, more use of subcontractors and criminal networks, and a sustained requirement for multi‑agency risk reviews for high‑priority individuals and sites. Police and policymakers alike are now treating this as a standing security challenge.