According to the UK Government's statement to the 10th Review Meeting of the Convention on Nuclear Safety in April 2026, the continued Russian presence at the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant is not only a wartime risk but a direct challenge to the rules that govern international nuclear safety. The UK said the nuclear safety dangers arise from Russia's illegal invasion of Ukraine and its continued presence at the site, which is preventing Ukraine's competent authorities from exercising effective regulatory control. In the UK's account, that also stops Ukraine from fully discharging its responsibilities as a contracting party under the Convention.
The statement then turned to the question of jurisdiction. The UK rejected Russia's claim that Zaporizhzhia has been transferred to Russian jurisdiction and said it does not accept any attempt by Moscow to report on the plant under the Convention. It aligned itself fully with the International Atomic Energy Agency's position that Zaporizhzhia remains a Ukrainian nuclear installation. That point is more than symbolic. The Convention on Nuclear Safety is built around reporting by the state that lawfully owns and regulates a nuclear installation. In the UK's reading of Article 4, only Ukraine is entitled to report on the safety of Zaporizhzhia.
The UK used that legal argument to make a broader institutional point about the review meeting itself. It said any reporting by a state that neither lawfully owns nor regulates a nuclear installation is not credible and would risk undermining the integrity of the Convention's peer review process. In practical terms, the warning is about regulatory legitimacy. If a review meeting were to accept submissions from an occupying power in place of the recognised regulator, the Convention's reporting system would become harder to defend. The issue is therefore not limited to one plant or one agenda item, but extends to how treaty compliance is assessed across the wider nuclear safety framework.
The statement also said Russia's actions show disregard for the Convention's objectives and obligations. The UK argued that nuclear installations are being exposed to conditions they were neither designed nor licensed to endure, while interference with independent regulatory oversight and with the responsibilities of the licence holder has made compliance materially harder for the Ukrainian organisations that remain legally responsible. Its reference to Articles 8 and 9 is significant. Those provisions concern the regulatory framework and the responsibility of the licence holder. By pointing to the presence of unauthorised personnel at Zaporizhzhia, the UK was arguing that the normal chain of accountability between operator, regulator and state party has been disrupted in a way that is fundamentally incompatible with maintaining a high level of nuclear safety.
The UK also drew attention to Ukraine's continued participation in the Convention process. It commended Kyiv for attending the review meeting and for continuing to meet its obligations under exceptionally difficult circumstances. That endorsement has a clear policy purpose. It signals that, in the UK's view, Ukraine remains the legitimate contracting party for the plant and that Ukrainian reporting should continue to be treated as the authoritative basis for any discussion of Zaporizhzhia within the Convention system.
The final part of the statement focused on the IAEA. The UK gave full support to the agency's work with Ukraine to reduce the risk of a nuclear accident and to maintain nuclear safety under what it described as unprecedented conditions. It also paid tribute to IAEA staff continuing to work with professionalism in a highly challenging operating environment. Taken together, the statement is best understood as a defence of treaty order inside the international nuclear safety system. The immediate dispute concerns whether Russia can claim a reporting role at Zaporizhzhia, but the wider question is whether the Convention on Nuclear Safety can continue to operate on the basis of lawful ownership, recognised oversight and independent verification during an armed occupation.