MI5 has issued an alert to MPs, peers and parliamentary staff about approaches attributed to China’s Ministry of State Security, prompting a ministerial statement in the House of Commons. Security minister Dan Jarvis said the government would not tolerate attempts by foreign states to interfere in the UK’s sovereign affairs and confirmed further protective steps.
The MI5 note, circulated by the Speakers of both Houses, highlighted two LinkedIn profiles, “Amanda Qiu” and “Shirly Shen”, which it said were being used as civilian “recruitment headhunters” to obtain insider insights from people working in and around politics. It is not clear whether the names and images on the accounts correspond to real individuals, but the warning emphasised outreach conducted at scale.
In his Commons statement, Jarvis said intelligence agencies had identified a deliberate effort to recruit and cultivate individuals with access to sensitive information about Parliament and government. He added that Chinese state actors apply a low threshold for what counts as useful data, aggregating apparently minor pieces to build a wider picture.
Parliamentary guidance accompanying the alert described approaches via professional networking sites, recruitment firms and consultants acting on behalf of Chinese state interests. Tactics referenced included invitations to fully funded trips to China and offers of payment for information through cash or cryptocurrency, with potential targets spanning parliamentary staff, economists, think‑tank employees, geopolitical consultants and members of both Houses.
A spokesperson for the Chinese embassy in London rejected the allegations as fabricated, said Beijing had lodged stern representations, and urged the UK to avoid further damage to bilateral relations. The embassy denied any involvement in espionage or political interference.
Jarvis outlined an initial package of measures. Government will invest £170m in upgraded encrypted systems for official business, alongside new protections against state‑linked cybercrime and attempts to influence UK university research. He said national security powers would be updated and strengthened where necessary to disrupt hostile activity.
Ministers also intend to tighten rules addressing covert funding of political parties and to provide the Electoral Commission with stronger enforcement powers. All parties and candidates contesting the Scottish Parliament, Welsh Senedd and local authority elections in England in May 2026 will receive security briefings focused on foreign interference risks.
Recognising that China remains the UK’s third‑largest trading partner, Jarvis said sanctions would be used when required. On a proposed Chinese embassy site in central London and planned ministerial visits to China, he noted that decisions would rest with the Housing Secretary and relevant departments.
In Parliament, Conservative MP Alicia Kearns urged the government to add China to the enhanced tier of the Foreign Influence Registration Scheme. At present only Iran and Russia are in that category, which prevents undertaking registrable activity on their behalf unless the work is pre‑registered. Jarvis said the government is considering further additions but has taken no decision.
Former Conservative leader Sir Iain Duncan Smith said the alert demonstrated an aggressive posture from China and argued ministers should explicitly describe China as a persistent national security threat. He called for greater vigilance across public life and stronger operational follow‑through.
The debate follows the collapse in September 2025 of a high‑profile case in which two men, including a parliamentary researcher, were accused of spying for China. Both denied wrongdoing. The Crown Prosecution Service said it could not proceed without government material classifying China as a national security threat, a position some legal commentators have disputed.
MI5 has previously issued interference alerts, including in 2022 regarding an alleged agent said to have sought influence in Parliament; the individual denied the allegations. The service has also warned that Chinese state actors seek bulk personal, financial and health data, and earlier in 2025 Director General Ken McCallum described the threat as daily.
For policy and compliance teams, the immediate priorities are procedural. Political parties should revisit donor due diligence and beneficial ownership checks, update training on foreign funding rules and maintain rapid reporting lines with the Electoral Commission. Parliamentary offices and contractors should verify unsolicited professional approaches, avoid sharing non‑public information and record any offers of travel or hospitality.
Universities, think tanks and consultancies engaged in China‑related research or advisory work should reassess cooperation agreements, strengthen conflict‑of‑interest declarations and follow Cabinet Office and National Protective Security Authority guidance on secure collaboration. Organisations are advised to escalate suspicious contacts to parliamentary security or MI5 and to apply least‑privilege principles to digital access.