In a statement delivered in New York on 11 October 2026 and published by the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office on 15 October 2026, David Riley, the UK's Ambassador and Permanent Representative to the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, set out the government's current security brief at the UN First Committee. The speech argues that the international security system is under sustained pressure from strategic rivalry, hostile state activity and rapid technological change. (gov.uk) That framing matters because it places information operations, arms control and AI governance in a single policy file. Rather than treating them as separate debates, the statement presents them as connected tests of sovereignty, territorial integrity and the continued authority of international law. (gov.uk)
Riley's sharpest warning concerns hostile activity against the information environment, with Russia identified as a major source of pressure on the UK and allied states. The same section links that warning to Russia's war against Ukraine, Iran's non-compliance with nuclear safeguards obligations and the DPRK's nuclear and ballistic missile programmes. (gov.uk) The practical reading is that London is grouping online interference, territorial aggression and proliferation risks within one wider picture of state competition. For departments working on sanctions, resilience, attribution or alliance policy, the speech points towards a joined-up rather than compartmentalised response. (gov.uk)
The statement also makes space for incremental progress. Riley points to agreement reached in September 2026 by the Group of Governmental Experts on Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems on elements for a possible future instrument after years of deadlock, and says recommendations to strengthen the Biological Weapons Convention are within reach. Those proposals include stronger mechanisms for international cooperation and assistance, alongside better capacity to respond to emerging technologies such as Frontier AI. (gov.uk) For policy readers, this is one of the clearest signals in the text. The UK is not arguing that new military technologies sit outside treaty processes; it is arguing that existing multilateral machinery should be updated quickly enough to deal with them. (gov.uk)
On nuclear policy, the government adopts a continuity line. The speech refers to the 11th Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, held in New York from 27 April to 22 May 2026, and acknowledges that states parties failed to agree a consensus final document. It nonetheless argues that the treaty's value and the commitment to implementation remain intact. (gov.uk) Riley highlights areas where common ground still exists, including transparency, risk reduction, safeguards, peaceful uses of nuclear technology and preventing further spread of nuclear weapons. In policy terms, the message is that deadlock in a review cycle should not be confused with abandonment of the wider non-proliferation regime. (gov.uk)
The defence passage is equally clear. The UK says it will keep investing in defence, meet NATO commitments and strengthen European capabilities, while also restating support for the IAEA safeguards system, responsible peaceful nuclear use and Nuclear Weapon Free Zones. The speech repeats a long-standing British position that a world without nuclear weapons remains the goal, but only through practical steps that can command broad support. (gov.uk) That is an important distinction. The text does not set deterrence against disarmament; it presents both as running together, with risk reduction, strategic stability and P5 dialogue used as the working method in a difficult security climate. (gov.uk)
The same approach appears in the treatment of chemical and biological weapons. Riley reaffirms support for both conventions, calls for the global prohibitions to be upheld and says those responsible for any use of such weapons should be held to account. He also describes the OPCW as central to international safety and commends its work with the Syrian Government on eliminating the remaining elements of the Assad regime's chemical weapons programme. (gov.uk) For practitioners, the point is less rhetorical than operational. The UK position rests on inspection, verification, treaty implementation and institutional support, with an increasing recognition that emerging science and AI will shape how compliance risks are identified and managed. (gov.uk)
Outer space is treated in similar terms. The UK says it will work to reduce the risk of conflict through transparency, confidence-building and other practical measures, and it reaffirms support for the UN Open-Ended Working Group on PAROS, the track on preventing an arms race in outer space. The warning is directed at efforts by some states to reinterpret the mandate and reopen the rival negotiating channels that previously divided discussions. (gov.uk) This may look procedural, but it is substantively important. In disarmament diplomacy, disagreement over forum and mandate can block progress as effectively as disagreement over substance, so London's defence of the OEWG route is also a defence of a single workable process. (gov.uk)
AI closes the statement and, in effect, ties its themes together. Riley describes Frontier AI as one of the defining challenges and opportunities of the age and says the UK will place AI at the heart of its 2027 G20 Presidency, with an emphasis on securing benefits while managing risks. That direction is consistent with wider government messaging on the UK's presidency year and the decision to make AI governance a headline international issue. (gov.uk) Taken as a whole, the speech reads less as a ceremonial UN intervention than as a compact statement of current British security policy. It links Russia, treaty compliance, autonomous weapons, space security and AI governance into one multilateral agenda, while insisting that the answer remains rule-based cooperation backed by defence capability. (gov.uk)