The United Kingdom reported that the UN Security Council unanimously adopted a Somalia resolution on 12 December 2025, framing a package to degrade Al‑Shabaab by constraining access to arms, disrupting financing and supporting Somali security capacity. The UK described a measured route for future adjustments to the arms embargo to keep the regime aligned with the threat.
The measures sit within a sanctions architecture reshaped in December 2023, when the Council lifted the country‑wide arms embargo on Somalia and refocused it on Al‑Shabaab. Resolution 2714 ended the general embargo, while Resolution 2713 imposed a group‑specific embargo with exemptions for Somalia’s recognised security institutions via notification and no‑objection procedures.
Earlier in 2025, the Council renewed maritime enforcement against illicit arms imports and charcoal exports and extended the mandate of the Al‑Shabaab sanctions Panel of Experts. Those steps reaffirmed controls on improvised explosive device components and preserved inspection powers at sea, underpinning the regime the Council has now endorsed again.
Council discussions this year repeatedly flagged weapons flows from Yemen to Somalia. Both the UK and several Council members urged closer coordination between the Al‑Shabaab sanctions committee established pursuant to Resolution 2713 and the Yemen 2140 Committee, noting that cooperation would improve monitoring of supply chains serving designated actors.
The UK statement accompanying Friday’s vote also referenced the campaign against Islamic State in Somalia and the need for Council members to intensify efforts to degrade that network alongside Al‑Shabaab. That emphasis keeps counter‑terrorism coordination at the centre of the Council’s approach to Somalia’s stabilisation agenda.
For compliance teams, the operative effect is continuity with tighter expectations. Deliveries to Somalia’s federal security institutions remain outside the embargo’s scope, but require documented conformity with notification or no‑objection procedures overseen by the 2713 Committee. Maritime interdiction authorities continue to support inspections of suspect cargoes linked to weapons or charcoal.
The 2140 regime on Yemen remains the reference point for listings, travel bans, asset freezes and targeted arms restrictions on designated individuals and entities. Coordination between the 2713 and 2140 committees is intended to align investigative leads, panel reporting and any future designations where material support or arms transfers cross both theatres.
Attention now shifts to the African Union Support and Stabilisation Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM). The Council authorised AUSSOM on 27 December 2024 for an initial 12 months, replacing ATMIS and mandating support to degrade Al‑Shabaab and affiliates, protect civilians and back Somalia’s security transition. The force level authorised through 31 December 2025 stands at 11,826 uniformed personnel, including police.
According to the AU mission documents, AUSSOM is designed to be more mobile and closely aligned with Somalia’s Security and Development Plan and National Security Architecture, with phased handover milestones. Any renewal or adjustment will need to reflect resources, human rights compliance and the tempo of Somali‑led operations.
What this means in practice: operators moving controlled items to Somali state security bodies should maintain clear end‑use documentation and retain evidence of committee notifications; banks should screen counterparties against current UN listings and be alert to trade in charcoal and dual‑use components associated with IEDs; and shippers transiting the Gulf of Aden and adjoining seas should expect continued interdiction activity tied to the UN regime. These are procedural, not political, tests of compliance under Security Council decisions already in force.