US forces seized the very large crude carrier Skipper off the Venezuelan coast on Wednesday 10 December, in a helicopter-boarding operation later publicised by the US Attorney General. The vessel has been described by US officials and media as previously sanctioned for moving crude linked to Iran and Venezuela under earlier identities. Footage released by the Department of Justice confirmed the boarding and control of the ship without reported casualties.
Guyana’s Maritime Administration Department said on 10 December that Skipper (ex‑Adisa; IMO 9304667) was falsely flying the Guyana flag and is not on its closed national registry. The authority stated it had been informed by the United States of the encounter and would work with partners to curb unauthorised flag use. False‑flagging exposes operators to detention and seizure risk, including for misrepresentation of nationality on the high seas.
Open-source tracking shows a sustained data gap before the operation. Public AIS transmissions from Skipper ceased on 7 November several miles off Guyana and only reappeared after the 10 December raid. Satellite imagery located the vessel at Venezuela’s Puerto José terminal on 18 November while it was not visible on public trackers, a position independently identified by commercial analysts and matched to imagery of the boarded ship.
Commodity intelligence indicates the cargo movements were active through November and early December. Kpler assessed that by mid‑November the tanker had taken on roughly 1.1 million barrels of Merey crude at José, with paperwork listing Cuba as destination; by early December external reporting placed total loadings nearer 1.8–2.0 million barrels. Imagery also points to a ship‑to‑ship transfer off Barcelona, Anzoátegui, on 7 December, days before the seizure.
Analysts further trace a 2025 pattern of deceptive navigation. While AIS signals suggested a call at Iraq’s Basrah Oil Terminal on 7–8 July, terminal records showed no such visit, with the tanker instead loading at Iran’s Kharg Island. Kpler data suggests a ship‑to‑ship transfer followed between 11 and 13 August, with the cargo later discharged in China under documentation the firm says was misdeclared.
Skipper’s sanctions history is documented by the US Treasury. In November 2022, the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) designated the vessel under its former name Adisa and sanctioned Marshall Islands‑based Triton Navigation Corp., identifying Adisa as property in which Triton held an interest as part of a network overseen by Russian national Viktor Artemov. Treasury stated the network moved Iranian oil to finance the IRGC‑QF and Hizballah. Transactions by US persons with designated parties are prohibited and non‑US actors face heightened secondary‑sanctions exposure.
AIS carriage and use are regulated under the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) Convention. Cargo ships of 300 GT and above on international voyages must carry AIS and keep it in effective operating condition; US Coast Guard guidance reiterates that AIS should be maintained and used correctly, with outages limited to brief, justified safety or security circumstances. Persistent manipulation or spoofing is a recognised red flag for maritime enforcement.
The United States’ cross‑government maritime advisory of 14 May 2020 sets out due diligence expectations for owners, charterers, traders, insurers, banks and registries. It lists deceptive practices-including AIS disablement or falsification, irregular ship‑to‑ship transfers and opaque ownership-as warning signs requiring enhanced scrutiny and controls. The Skipper case displays multiple indicators highlighted in that advisory.
Flag and registry issues now sit alongside wider enforcement against the so‑called shadow or dark fleet. Treasury has repeatedly warned that older tankers operating outside normal classification, insurance and tracking norms pose safety and financial risks to counterparties and waterways. For compliance teams, that means validating flag claims directly with registries and treating sudden flag or name changes as triggers for documentary and technical checks.
What this means in practice: counterparties should screen Skipper/Adisa and associated entities, including Triton Navigation Corp., against sanctions lists; reconcile AIS with satellite and port‑log evidence; require full voyage and bill‑of‑lading packages; and document any AIS outages with master’s statements and LRIT corroboration. The Department of Justice reports that the seizure followed a federal warrant, signalling continued use of civil and criminal tools where deceptive shipping practices intersect with sanctions programmes.