As of 3 March 2026, the conflict launched by coordinated US–Israeli strikes on Iran has entered its third day, with Tehran retaliating against Gulf states and Western assets. The UK has now approved limited US use of British bases, marking a material policy shift as regional air defences continue to engage waves of Iranian missiles and drones. CENTCOM has also confirmed a serious deconfliction failure: three US F‑15E jets were downed over Kuwait by friendly fire, with all six crew recovered alive. (theguardian.com)
Washington’s declared objectives have been set out by President Donald Trump and his team: to destroy Iran’s missile arsenal and production, neutralise its navy, constrain proxy activity, and ensure Iran does not obtain a nuclear weapon. In public remarks and official messaging since 28 February, the administration framed the air campaign-dubbed Operation Epic Fury-as time‑limited but open‑ended if required. These statements include language about “raze[ing]” Iran’s missile industry and “annihilat[ing]” its navy; they also call on Iranians to seize a political opening. (en.people.cn)
Some specific presidential claims warrant context. While the White House argues Iran poses a growing long‑range missile threat, open assessments from the US intelligence community and defence analysts indicate Iran has not tested or deployed an intercontinental ballistic missile and, as of 2025, had not re‑authorised a nuclear weapons programme-even as its 60% enrichment stockpile and breakout potential had increased. The IAEA has struggled to verify current stocks amid access gaps since renewed strikes. (armyrecognition.com)
Israel’s stated aim, as articulated by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, is to remove what he calls an existential threat from Tehran and degrade the networks that arm groups such as Hezbollah. Israeli politics are in the frame: regular elections are due by October 2026, and a decisive outcome against Iran would reshape domestic accountability debates after the Gaza and Lebanon escalations. (theguardian.com)
Tehran’s near‑term objective is survival of the system. Following Iranian state media’s announcement of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei’s death and a declared 40‑day mourning period, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and aligned organs have pledged “harsh” retaliation while shifting to decentralised operations. Historically, the IRGC (roughly 150,000–190,000 personnel) and the Basij paramilitary (tens of thousands active, with large mobilisation potential) have been configured to protect the regime at home and prosecute asymmetric action abroad. (presstv.ir)
On the ground, the conflict is now regional. Kuwait, the UAE, Qatar and others have reported intercepting substantial numbers of Iranian drones and missiles, with civilian casualties and infrastructure damage from debris and leakage through defences. Airspace restrictions and mass flight cancellations continue across Gulf hubs, indicating a sustained threat tempo from Iran’s strike complex. (en.wikipedia.org)
A major operational risk was underscored late on 1–2 March when Kuwaiti air defences mistakenly engaged three US F‑15E Strike Eagles during an intense Iranian attack window. CENTCOM said all crew ejected safely; Kuwait acknowledged the incident and opened an investigation. The episode illustrates the deconfliction challenges created by overlapping coalition, host‑nation and adversary air activity. (apnews.com)
The UK’s role has shifted. After initially declining broader offensive support, Prime Minister Keir Starmer authorised US access to British bases strictly for “specific and limited” defensive action against Iranian missile storage and launch sites, grounded in collective self‑defence of partners and protection of British nationals. Downing Street has published a legal position and joined France and Germany in an E3 statement condemning Iran’s regional strikes. (gov.uk)
The UK decision follows direct pressure on British assets. The Ministry of Defence confirmed a suspected one‑way attack drone struck RAF Akrotiri in Cyprus, causing limited damage to the runway and prompting the dispersal of non‑essential personnel. There were no casualties; base protection measures were increased and local authorities reported additional drone interceptions. (news.sky.com)
Energy, trade and consular impacts are broadening. Brent crude spiked on 1–2 March amid reports of disrupted tanker movements and threats around the Strait of Hormuz, with analysts warning that a prolonged closure would significantly amplify inflationary pressures and risk market instability across Europe and Asia. Airline cancellations and diversions across the region continue to affect passenger flows and logistics chains. (theguardian.com)
On nuclear‑related risks, the IAEA has said it has no confirmed indication of damage to Iranian nuclear sites from the first strike waves, while acknowledging contact gaps with Iranian counterparts. Even before the war, inspectors warned that high‑level enrichment and lost continuity of knowledge had narrowed warning time if Tehran chose to break out. This technical picture, rather than political slogans, will shape non‑proliferation options once combat operations ebb. (washingtonpost.com)
Historical experience suggests the limits of coercion by air alone. Scholarship and operational case studies-from Kosovo to Libya-indicate that decapitation or punishment campaigns rarely produce durable regime change without a viable internal or ground component and post‑conflict arrangements, raising the risk of disorder even if state military capacity is heavily degraded. (foreignaffairs.com)
Domestic politics in the US and UK are already shaping the theatre. In Washington, a War Powers debate is under way over authorisation, scope and duration of operations; in London, parties and select committees are pressing for ongoing transparency on the legal basis, mission creep risks and parliamentary scrutiny should UK support widen beyond tightly defined defence. (washingtonpost.com)
In practical terms, the conflict’s immediate endpoints are constrained by each actor’s definition of success. For Washington and Jerusalem, disabling Iran’s missile and drone complex and constraining its proxy architecture are measurable but not necessarily decisive without political change in Tehran; for the Iranian leadership, survival-and the capacity to regenerate deterrent forces-would be claimed as victory. The policy task over the coming days is to maintain guardrails that protect civilians and critical infrastructure while creating diplomatic space for de‑escalation consistent with stated legal bases. (washingtonpost.com)