Five European governments have concluded that Alexei Navalny was killed by poisoning with the toxin epibatidine and have formally notified the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) of a breach of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). The joint statement, issued on 14 February 2026 by the UK, Sweden, France, Germany and the Netherlands, follows laboratory analyses of samples from Navalny. He died in custody on 16 February 2024 at corrective colony IK‑3 in Kharp, Yamalo‑Nenets, while serving a 19‑year sentence. The governments state that only the Russian state had the means, motive and opportunity to administer the toxin while he was imprisoned. Russia maintains he died of natural causes. (gov.uk)
According to the statement, allied laboratories “conclusively confirmed” the presence of epibatidine in Navalny’s samples and noted that the compound is not naturally found in Russia. On that basis, the five governments have written to the OPCW Director‑General to record their view that Russia has breached the CWC and to signal further action using available policy tools. Moscow rejects the allegation. (gov.uk)
Epibatidine is a potent alkaloid associated with South American poison dart frogs and acts primarily as a nicotinic acetylcholine receptor agonist. At very low doses it can cause rapid paralysis and respiratory failure; it has no accepted medical use in humans due to its extreme toxicity. These characteristics make any deliberate administration a matter for international arms control. (en.wikipedia.org)
Under the CWC’s general‑purpose criterion, any chemical that can cause death or harm through its chemical action is a “toxic chemical” regardless of origin or production method; using such a chemical as a weapon is prohibited at all times (Articles I and II). Toxins are therefore covered even when of biological origin or synthesised. The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) separately prohibits toxins for hostile purposes, with States Parties undertaking never to develop, produce, stockpile, acquire or retain them. (opcw.org)
Procedurally, informing the OPCW can lead to consultations under Article IX and, if concerns persist, to an on‑site challenge inspection. In cases of alleged use, investigations are conducted under the Verification Annex, Part XI, including sampling of biomedical and environmental material. Findings are reported to the Executive Council and all States Parties. (opcw.org)
Attribution is constrained by mandate. The OPCW’s Investigation and Identification Team (IIT) is empowered to identify perpetrators only for incidents in the Syrian Arab Republic pursuant to Conference decision C‑SS‑4/DEC.3; outside that context, the OPCW typically establishes technical facts rather than assigning responsibility. States may nonetheless pursue accountability through the OPCW’s policy bodies and other international mechanisms. (opcw.org)
Where the OPCW Executive Council considers that obligations have not been met, it may recommend measures to the Conference of the States Parties under Article XII, including restricting or suspending a State Party’s rights and privileges and, in grave cases, referring the matter to the UN General Assembly and Security Council. This route was used in 2021 to suspend certain rights of Syria under the Convention. (opcw.org)
The BTWC has fewer institutional tools. States Parties can seek a formal consultative meeting under Article V or lodge a complaint with the UN Security Council under Article VI, though practice shows limited uptake and high politicisation. For toxins, the UN Secretary‑General’s Mechanism (UNSGM) remains the only standing international instrument to investigate alleged biological or toxin weapon use beyond the CWC framework. (disarmament.unoda.org)
The governments’ reference to prior incidents provides context. In 2020, OPCW‑designated laboratories confirmed biomarkers of a Novichok‑type agent in Navalny’s samples after a German request for technical assistance. Separately, OPCW assistance missions in the UK in 2018 confirmed the toxic chemical used in the Salisbury and Amesbury cases, the latter linked to the death of Dawn Sturgess. (opcw.org)
The statement also questions Russia’s past declarations. Russia announced completion of destruction of its declared Cold War‑era chemical stockpiles in 2017, and in July 2023 the OPCW confirmed that all declared stockpiles worldwide had been irreversibly destroyed following the United States’ completion. Any allegation of current possession or use would therefore raise concerns about undeclared capabilities rather than declared stockpiles. (dw.com)
Policy levers outside the OPCW include sanctions regimes. The EU’s thematic chemical weapons framework (Council Decision 2018/1544 and related measures) and the UK’s Chemical Weapons (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019 empower targeted asset freezes and travel bans for involvement in the development, transfer or use of chemical weapons, or for supporting those activities. These regimes can be expanded as evidence is assessed. (eur-lex.europa.eu)
Next steps will centre on treaty procedures. The communication to the OPCW Director‑General enables formal consideration by the Executive Council under Article IX, with States Parties able to seek clarification, request investigations of alleged use, and consider compliance measures under Article XII. In parallel, BTWC States Parties retain options for consultations and, if pursued, referral to the UN Security Council. The timeline and scope of any process will depend on access to evidence and decisions of States Parties. (opcw.org)